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Abstract:
Technology is often used by senior management as an instrument to 
deliver strategy by influencing day-to-day activities within organisations. 
We study how local teams appropriate strategy through the use of 
technology, specifically in instances where it is rigid and single purposed. 
We show that technology has the potential to act as a carrier of strategic 
intent. We theorise local practices of appropriation of strategic intent by 
conceptualising the role of technology in “instantiation”, a notion 
adopted within the strategy-as-practice literature to explain how 
localised micro events directly constitute higher-level business outcomes 
such as strategy. Through an in-depth case study following the use of 
self-service kiosks in a UK airport over a period of 20 months, we review 
the strategic drivers at the top of the organisation and the central role of 
technology as the delivery mechanism of strategy. We focus on 
emergent strategising activity by local teams on the ground. Our main 
theoretical contributions are thus to extend the concept of instantiation 
to Information Systems studies and to conceptualise technology as a 
carrier of strategy, particularly in explaining how technology can embed 
strategic intent (structural strategising) and then influence the 
emergence of local practices consistent with these objectives (emergent 
strategising). We find and conceptualise how local practices instantiate 
strategic intent by decoupling, reframing and then recoupling new logics 
of work to achieve the aims set out in the organisation’s strategy.
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Bonchek (2017) argues that “Execution is where good strategies go to die” in referring to the 
often underestimated distance between strategic intent from the top of organisations and the 
actual, realised strategy in practice. This analytical separation between planning and 
execution of strategy has dominated academic research but recently a more integrated 
“adaptive turn” has been called upon (Weiser et al., 2020). Within the strategic Information 
Systems (IS) field, research initially emphasised the role of good central strategic planning 
(e.g., Earl, 1993, Lederer and Gardiner, 1992), but more recent research has given much 
more attention to the execution and practices that deliver strategic intent on the ground (e.g., 
Peppard et al., 2014). For example, Arvidsson et al. (2014 p.46) make this point clearly when 
they say that “strategy is dependent upon the way it is enacted” while also highlighting the 
importance of creating tight links b tween an organisation’s strategic intent, the ensuing 
information systems implementation and the de-facto realised strategy. Despite the significant 
and growing effort in the IS field to study links and alignment between technology and business 
strategy (Benbya et al., 2019), we still have a deficient view of how strategy travels to, and is 
constituted, at ground level in organisations. Karpo sky and Galliers (2015; p.1) argue that 
“we still know little about what it is that organizational actors actually do, on a day-to-day basis, 
to align information systems and related concerns with business imperatives”. Indeed, a major 
missing component in contemporary IS research is to reconceptualise the role of technology 
in organisational strategising by focusing on how local use of that technology may enact 
strategic intent (Whittington, 2014, Peppard et al., 2014, Arvidsson et al., 2014, Arvidsson and 
Holmstrom, 2018). Our concern is therefore to re-conceptualise the role and significance of 
technology-led initiatives in strategic organisational change by going beyond first order effects 
of digital transformation in organisations (Baptista et al., 2020). We depart from superficial 
views of this as an implementation problem or as tactical local response to new mandated 
technology (Mackay and Zundel, 2017). We aim instead to capture the strategic significance 
Page 2 of 43
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jin






























































of technology as a carrier of strategy and its ability to instantiate – to make real – strategy at 
the ground level of organisations.
The role of technology in strategy and organisational change has been viewed from a number 
of different perspectives in the IS literature over the years, from Barley’s (1986) view of 
technology as an “occasion” for organisational change to Markus’s (2004) notion of 
technochange, for example. This literature typically places emphasis on either the technology 
or the organisation as the driver of strategic change but often takes for granted a degree of 
interpretive flexibility in the technology (Orlikowski, 1992), thereby accepting that technology 
evolves to “accommodate” change (Markus and Robey, 1988) by “inscribing” and “translating” 
technology in organisational activity (Beynon-Davies, 2011, Beynon-Davies et al., 2009, 
Latour, 1991). In these studies, the mutual changes and interplay between the organisation 
and technology (Baptista, 2009) underpin processes of local adjustment and change in 
relation to intended strategic aims. Berente and Yoo (2012) conceptualise the trigger for this 
process as the loose coupling of routines when the logics embedded in the new technology 
clash with the logics used by people to work on the ground. The sociomaterial entanglement 
of technologies and work routines (Hultin and Mähring, 2014) ultimately leads to the 
technology gaining meaning at the local level and in turn adjusting local practices to reflect 
intended strategic aims from the top of organisations. It is this ongoing process of “aligning” 
at the local level (Karpovsky and Galliers, 2015) that has the potential to link technology use 
with intended strategic aims.
In this study, we go deeper in exploring how strategic intent can be directly observed in the 
use of technology and operational practices on the ground, rather than as a process that 
unfolds over time. We contribute to recent research that breaks down the artificial separation 
between practices and praxis suggesting that strategy is fluid and runs seamlessly from 
ideation to implementation/enactment (Leonardi, 2015). This is consistent with the shift in 
strategy research too, which has seen the emergence of what Weiser et al. (2020) call the 
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“adaptive turn”, removing the analytical separation between the creation and the 
implementation of strategy and to paying more attention to dynamic processes of enactment 
of strategy. These ideas can be traced to earlier work by Walsham and Han (1993) when he 
talks of the formation - rather than the formulation - of strategy, and earlier still, of Mintzberg’s 
discussion of emergent strategies (e.g., Mintzberg and Waters, 1985).
To fully capture the effects of technology on the process of enacting a business-level strategy, 
we focus on a case where technology is extremely rigid (Desouza, 2006, Galliers, 2006). Rigid 
technologies have less capacity for interpretive flexibility (Doherty et al., 2006) when 
implemented as they have predefined characteristics and functions and leave little opportunity 
for users and local teams to adapt and customise them to their needs. Further, rigid 
technologies have deeply embedded business logics, and therefore react or contrast more 
sharply with established local logics of work and social values (Friedland and Alford, 1991, 
Thornton et al., 2012), especially in periods of strategic change in organisations (Berente and 
Yoo, 2012). 
We study rigid technologies because they allow us to remove possible adjustments in the 
technology and focus instead on the practices as they emerge, consistent with the strategic 
structures embedded in the technology. Unlike studies of workarounds where local users find 
alternative ways to perform their work (Alter, 2014, Rossi et al., 2020, Ioannis and 
Nandhakumar, 2009), our study is centred on a large “mandated” technology programme 
where senior management specify and impose the technology without room for alternative 
arrangements, as in the study by Carugati et al., (2018). The blunt and single-purposed nature 
of the technology removes the capacity for adaptation to local needs, allowing us to focus on 
their role as carriers of strategic intent and to capture emergent everyday practices of users. 
Our aim is not to conceptualise the process of implementation of the technology (as a process 
with discrete stages). Instead, our aim is to observe and capture the strategic value of 
everyday activity and practices on the ground, as they emerge shaped by the use of new 
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technology .We develop this distinction between process and practice in our conceptual 
background section.
Another important implication of the rigid nature of the technology is its potential to amplify the 
effects of loose coupling (Berente and Yoo, 2012) between strategic intent and actual 
practices on the ground, and potentially lead to clashes that can more easily be captured. This 
means that local teams have to reconstruct new logics of work and meaning around the new 
technology, based on emergent new localised practices (Bechky, 2011). We use the term 
“logics” loosely here to describe widely accepted shared values and references driving local 
behaviour in organisations, in line with Berente and Yoo (2012).
Few studies in the IS field have captured the strategic significance of technology in carrying 
strategic intent and shaping local action. Some authors have shifted our attention from static 
views of strategy towards a view of strategy as an activity (Jarzabkowski, 2003) or strategising 
(Galliers, 2011, 2004), while others focus on everyday practices from a Strategy-as-Practice 
perspective (Peppard et al., 2014, Whittington, 2014, Henfridsson and Lind, 2014, Huang et 
al., 2014, Arvidsson et al., 2014, Leonard and Higson, 2014). However, more research is still 
needed to understand the doing (activities, strategising, practice) effects that constitute 
strategy-as-realised in an organisation. The detailed analysis of mundane, everyday events 
may at first seem far removed from strategy, but these have the potential to represent the 
genesis of actualised strategy (Kouamé and Langley, 2018), particularly if they are influenced 
and shaped by embedded logics within technology-in-use.
If a realised strategy is constituted through the doing of strategy (practices) and the embedded 
logics within technology-in-use, some interesting questions arise. These include: Can the 
technology act as a carrier of strategic business objectives to teams on the ground? and How 
do teams on the ground reconfigure their work practices around the strategic demands 
imposed by the new technology? A supplementary question arises from the latter, which is, 
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Do these new local technology-based practices constitute strategy? It is interesting to ask 
whether local technology-based practices change in response to a new and rigid technology 
and do they indeed constitute strategy or have any strategic significance. Thus, and more 
precisely, the key research question we ask is, What is the role of technology in realising 
strategy on the ground?
To examine the link between local activity and strategic intent as articulated by managers in 
the higher echelons of organisations, we study the case of a large, rigid and single-purposed 
technology. Our study captures how this technology shaped the practices of local teams on 
the ground to reflect specific strategic objectives set by senior executives. We capture the 
effort by local teams to reconfigure their work around the requirements arising from the 
demands of a new strategy and its accompanying new technology. The case follows the 
implementation1 of self-service check-in kiosks in a regional airport in the UK and its business-
level strategy, which aims to increase the scale of operations by serving more passengers 
without expanding the size of its terminal buildings.
The paper is structured as follows. In this section we motivate the study by identifying the need 
for more IS research that is focused on local level activity with strategic significance. The next 
section grounds the study in the strategy-as-practice literature and draws specifically on the 
concept of strategy instantiation (Kouamé and Langley (2018) in order to establish the 
theoretical background of the study. We then outline and justify the methods used in this single 
in-depth case study research design. The findings section then traces strategic activity at the 
top of the organisation, to show how the technology was tightly coupled with organisational 
strategy, and then shows evidence of emergent strategising practices at the local level of the 
organisation. This is followed by a conceptualisation of the role of technology as a carrier and 
1 We use the word “implementation” to refer to the roll out of the technology in organisations. Our views 
and conceptual approach to strategy are practice-based and performative and therefore distinct from a 
process approach sometimes associated with implementation.
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sense-giver of intended strategy from the top of the organisation to local teams. We conceive 
three elements of instantiation based on our analysis: decoupling, reframing, and recoupling. 
These concepts explain the process by which operational teams develop or learn practices 
consistent with strategic intent embedded in the technology – we show that this enables the 
instantiation of strategy through the technology deployed. We conclude by highlighting the 
theoretical contributions and practical implications of this study.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
The focus of our research is to establish a link between local level technology use and 
business-level strategy (Chia and Holt, 2006, Chia and Rasche, 2015). Technology has the 
potential to shape and stimulate local reflective action consistent with strategic intent and, 
therefore, to act as a sense-giver of strategy on the ground (Rouleau, 2005). To advance this 
conceptualisation of the performative nature of strategy through technology-in-use we draw 
on the concept of “instantiation” (Kouamé and Langley, 2018). Instantiation provides a lens 
that views technology as inherently embedding strategic intent, and therefore with the potential 
to shape in-use practices and so perform a similar role to middle managers in carrying strategy 
across organisations (Rouleau, 2005, Rouleau and Balogun, 2011).
In order to trace macro-level concepts such as ‘business strategy’ within individual actions 
and thinking (practices at local level) that unfold through technology use, we take a “mixed-
level theory” conceptual position (Markus and Robey, 1988). Our emphasis on practices as 
the locus of strategy (cf., Bourdieu, 1990) reflects a distinct research perspective that 
acknowledges microprocesses (what people do) as constitutive of macro-outcomes (realised 
strategy) in organisations (Whittington et al., 2006, Jarzabkowski et al., 2007, Jarzabkowski 
and Wilson, 2006, Jarzabkowski, 2004). By taking this perspective, we view practices on the 
ground as constitutive of, and continually re-making, broader social and organisational 
structures with strategic significance (Schatzki et al., 2001, Kouamé and Langley, 2018). 
Strategy, therefore, cannot be reduced, or abstracted, merely to the organisational plan. 
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Rather, strategy is performative because it is defined by, and shapes, the subjects and objects 
involved in its making (Kornberger & Clegg, 2011) – a perspective that is consistent and 
underpins the large body of research in strategy-as-practice (Whittington, 2006, Whittington 
et al., 2011).
However, within this larger body of strategy research, there are three distinct approaches that 
link local practices with macro structures in organisations (Kouamé and Langley, 2018). The 
first sees the link as variance, the second as progression and the third as instantiation as 
viable ways to link microprocesses and macro-outcomes. The distinct characteristics of these 
three types of strategy research are summarised in Table 1, based on the work by Kouamé 
and Langley (2018), to which we have added a row describing how technology is viewed within 
each type of research on strategy-as-practice. 
Variance Progression Instantiation
Purpose Finding multilevel and 
generalizable causal links, 
from micro to macro
Showing progressive 
and/or mutual influence 






Form Variance theory (linear, 
contingency)
Process theory (e.g., flow 
matrix, recursive model, 
outcome-driven)
Practice theory
Logic Association Temporality Embeddedness
Assumption Micro influences macro Micro and macro are 
recursively interconnected
Micro constitutes or 
performs macro
Approach Cross-sectional Diachronic Synchronic 
Role of 
technology
Aspects of the technology 




Strategy results from 
iterations between 
technology and its use 
implementing technology 
over time
Technology use directly 
constitutes and 
performs strategy
Table 1: Views on the role of technology in the three types of micro-macro links in strategy 
research (based on Kouame and Langley, 2018).
The differences between the three types of strategy research have implications when studying 
the role of technology in strategising. For example, there are differences in the purpose and 
form of research when conceptualising how strategy takes place in an organisation. Variance-
type research seeks to find and test generalisable and causal relationships between micro 
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level processes and macro level outcomes. For example, much of the literature on 
microfoundations (Teece, 2017) can be categorised as variance research. In contrast, 
progression studies reject the claim that micro processes cause strategic outcomes, arguing 
instead that micro processes and macro phenomena interact recursively over time to produce 
in time a state of strategy. In contrast, instantiation studies show how macro outcomes are 
accomplished through microprocesses, specifically practices accomplish (rather than cause) 
macro outcomes. 
The underpinning logic for each of the three types of strategy research is also distinct. While 
variance studies associate micro processes (i.e., positive or negative association) with a 
strategic outcome, studies anchored in progression draw on recursive interactions between 
the micro and the macro through time to influence strategic outcomes – an approach typical 
of process studies (Pettigrew, 1990, Johnson, 1992). However, instantiation is based on a 
logic of embeddedness to explain “how microprocesses accomplish macro outcomes” 
(Kouamé and Langley, 2018 p. 7). From this perspective, micro-activity does not evolve or 
emerge, it inherently and “directly instantiate[s] or constitute[s] the macro-processes through 
which the organisation exists” (ibid.;14). This means that local, mundane activities have the 
potential to “instantiate” high-level strategy, or in other words, the micro constitutes or 
performs the macro. Thus, microprocesses (events and practices at ground-level of 
organisations performed by individuals and groups) are constitutive of macro-outcomes 
including formal and informal structures within organisations, including policies and other goal-
oriented features responsible for significant shifts in the direction of an organisation.
This has important implications for the role of technology in shaping strategic outcomes, which 
we capture in the last row of Table 1. Much IS research follows variance (See Moeini et al., 
2020) or progression perspectives. The former examines correlations or contingency between 
variables to explain an influence of the micro on the macro; the latter takes a process view of 
strategy in organisations (Pettigrew, 1990, Johnson, 1992). Process research takes a 
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longitudinal view to explain the link between the micro and macro levels, but distinctively, it 
means that they see technology as a driver of strategy while not always recognising everyday 
practices and microprocesses as inherently strategic in nature. In this study, we follow the 
instantiation perspective to provide a fresh view as to the strategic significance of technology 
in-use to create, rather than influence, strategy. 
Although the IS field is already taking an interest in “the work, workers and tools of strategy” 
(Peppard et al., 2014 p.1, Knight et al., 2018), calling for a research partnership between the 
fields of Strategy and IS (Whittington, 2014), there are still only a few studies that capture the 
role of technology in the creation of strategy at the local level (Marabelli and Galliers, 2017); 
the role that IT tools have in strategy practice (Kaplan, 2011, Knight et al., 2018), and on their 
impact on practices following system implementation (Barrett et al., 2016, Aversa et al., 2018). 
This theoretical position provides a basis to study the capacity of technology to carry strategic 
intent and regulate and frame local action consistent with strategic imperatives. From this 
perspective, we argue that it is the use of technology at the local level that instantiates 
business level strategy, addressing directly the linking of microprocesses and macro-
outcomes. We now describe the methodological approach used in the empirical work 
undertaken in our study. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
Research design and data collection
Our research questions set out to address how technology acts as a carrier of strategy and 
whether associated practices constitute that strategy. Hence, the research was designed to 
capture strategy on the ground or “reality in flight” (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1993) as 
organisational actors sought to work through the implementation of a new strategic technology 
initiative. This required an exploratory and broadly inductive research approach to allow us to 
conceptualise the role of technology as a possible carrier of strategy by analysing the links 
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between local practices with intended higher-level strategy (Gioia and Thomas, 1996, Gioia 
and Chittipeddi, 1991). A single, in-depth qualitative case study research strategy (Myers, 
1997) was used to examine the emerging organisational practices by key stakeholders. The 
case follows in real-time how the strategy was communicated, and the technology adopted. 
Data collection spans the period immediately prior to, and in parallel with, implementation of 
the new technology in order to capture both the conditions of intended use (the strategic plan) 
and the actual issues and practices inherent in the use of the technology. 
Our effort was to closely follow the adoption of automated self-service check-in kiosks, 
introduced as a strategic IT-driven project within a regional UK airport. We chose this as a 
case of an extremely rigid technology, which was implemented top-down by senior managers 
at the corporate-level of the organisation. The technology served a single purpose to process 
passenger check-ins in airports and provided very limited malleability and flexibility for 
adaptation locally. This newly adopted technology offered the opportunity to capture and 
analyse how technology can act as a carrier of strategic intent, given that strategic intent is 
preserved in the technology by its rigid nature. We captured local reaction to the technology 
to analyse how local teams appropriated the strategy carried within it. 
We studied the practices of the managers and employees on the ground as part of a project 
where ten new self-service check-in kiosks were adopted in a large regional airport. This was 
part of a group of airports to introduce 90 kiosks at three airport sites. Data collection involved 
a combination of in-depth semi-structured interviews, non-participant observation, informal 
discussions, and review of documentary data to produce a single in-depth case study covering 
the introduction and implementation of Common-Use Self-Service (CUSS) check-in kiosks in 
the airport over 20 months. The core of our analysis draws on direct observations and 
immersion of the researcher into the organisation. We observed and interviewed the main 
project stakeholders, including the managers at the airport and the management team at the 
corporate level who commissioned the project. We also captured the activities of terminal 
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managers and the IT function and, more crucially, the customer services manager and their 
team of customer service assistants who were responsible for launching the new 
technology with passengers in the airport. Data collection also involved a total of eighteen in-
depth interviews lasting between one and three hours, comprising eight interviews with 
members of the kiosks project team and ten interviews with IT suppliers, handling agents, 
airline management and managers at other UK airports, each of whom worked on the project. 
Accompanying the interviews, forty hours of non-participant observation were conducted on-
site to examine technology in-use. Appendix 1 provides a detailed interview schedule and the 
observations conducted. 
We conducted detailed observations over a sustained period of six months to ensure that we 
observed, and captured, what people “actually” did while performing their everyday working 
activities, which is different from “what they say they do” and “what they ought to be doing” 
(Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011 p. 1241). This period of observation captured the 
implementation of the CUSS technology, involving the researcher spending four to five hours 
on each visit alongside the customer services team and managers overseeing the project. 
Observations focused on the check-in of passengers to observe how between six to fifteen 
flights would use both the new self-service kiosks and the existing, desk-based, check-in 
process. Observations began to follow a routine with the researcher arriving before and 
remaining until after each check-in period. This enabled observation of the staff and 
passengers and their use of the new technology. It also allowed observation and discussion 
with staff who would congregate to discuss, criticise and reflect on issues relating to the 
technology before and after they had performed the passenger check-in process. These 
periods of observation complemented the interviews and provided a valuable opportunity to 
question and clarify specific events or issues with the kiosk project team throughout data 
collection. Specifically, we examined instances where members of the project team changed 
or improvised new routines when they experienced tensions between the intended functioning 
of the CUSS system and operational demands (Kamoche et al., 2003, Pina e Cunha et al., 
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1999). This helped us to unpack the emergence of local practices in response to the 
technology that was designed to achieve very specific business imperatives. 
Data analysis
Data from interviews, discussions, documentary sources and non-participant observation 
were treated as texts which provide “a window into human experience” (Ryan and Bernard, 
2000 p. 769). These were transcribed and imported into the NVIVO qualitative analysis 
software. Data were thematically coded (Ayres, 2008), initially using open coding (Urquhart et 
al., 2010) to identify pertinent and enduring themes. The coding process began in parallel with 
data collection so that clarification could be sought from informants to ensure greater 
consistency within and between data sources. 
We used theory to guide our analysis as a sensitising device while allowing new concepts to 
emerge as new theoretical explanations (Gioia et al., 2012). Our effort was to theorise from 
the data collected how individuals make sense of their normal daily work (Bechky, 2011). This 
allowed us to theorise but stay close to the way individuals made sense of their practices at 
local level in relation to the introduction of new technology in line with Gioia et al.’s (2012 p. 
16) advice to “capture concepts relevant to the human organisational experience in terms that 
are adequate at the level of meaning of the people living that experience and adequate at the 
level of scientific theorizing about that experience” and also Lee’s (2010) call for the starting 
point of IS research to be the “natives” themselves (professionals, managers, executives) and 
to capture “theory-in-use”, rather than “espoused theories”.
Our research approach was inspired by previous studies in the field of Information Systems 
that have focused on practice to study technology in-use in organisations (Orlikowski, 2002). 
We used, in particular, the account by Schultze (2000) of an ethnographer researching the 
work practices of individuals in their natural organisational settings as guidance and a sound 
research model to follow. In our case, we captured practices and processes of individuals 
Page 13 of 43
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jin






























































during implementation while the technology was being adopted by local teams. We paid 
particular attention to how these teams reconciled strategic aims articulated by managers and 
the characteristics of the technology with their emerging activities on the ground. Our aim was 
as to develop a rich and thick description of a unique case (Lee and Baskerville, 2003).
Consistent with our interpretive approach, we gradually became aware of regularities in our 
observations. This enabled ongoing reflections of events and observations following the 
principles of the hermeneutic circle (Boland, 1991, Lee, 1994) working in iterative stages 
between data gathering and conceptualisation. By going forward and back between our data 
and our theoretical framing we identified decoupling, reframing, and recoupling as elements 
of instantiation. Appendix 2 provides an overview of data analysis, including a table showing 
the analytical process with first and second level coding, following Gioia et al.’s (2012) 
guidelines.
FINDINGS: STRATEGY INSTANTIATION AT THE NMA
The study was undertaken at the North Midlands Airport (NMA) in the UK. This international 
airport was privatised in 1993 and sold in 2001 to the current owner, the Northern Airport 
Group (NAG). NAG owned four UK airports and was one of three airport groups serving 94% 
of UK airline passengers. The UK airport sector served 236 million passengers per year and 
2.3 million aircraft movements around the time of the study (Civil Aviation Authority, 2009). 
NMA handled close to 5 million passengers. Our study focuses on NMA’s CUSS project 
(Common-Use Self-Service) which involved the implementation of 10 self-service kiosks, 
which was part of a larger roll-out of 90 kiosks by NAG at the time. We focus on NMA as the 
CUSS project was implemented in its entirety internally, providing a clear line of sight from 
strategic intent to strategy implementation. 
Our findings are presented in two parts to capture strategic activity at both the top of the 
organisation (intended strategy or structural strategising) and at the local level (enacted 
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strategy or emergent strategising). We distinguish between structural and emergent 
strategising to show activity with strategic significance both at the top of the organisation and 
by local teams on the ground. We pay particular attention to the role of technology in carrying 
strategic intent from top managers to local teams. 
In the first part of this section we review the strategic drivers that focused the attention of 
senior management and NMA on technology (such as self-service kiosks) as their response 
to increasing competitive pressures in the airport sector.  We then explain how the CUSS 
project became integral to the strategic objectives set by senior managers. We characterise 
this process as structural strategising to represent the tight coupling between the new strategy 
of NMA and the kiosk technology used in CUSS. In the second part of this section we deepen 
our analysis to show activity by teams on the ground as they rethink their roles and processes 
to accommodate the new mandated self-service kiosks at the airport. The introduction of the 
kiosks dislodged established practices and routines of these local teams. This meant that the 
teams had to redefine the passenger check-in process by allowing new meaning structures to 
emerge consistent with the capabilities of the kiosk technology. We characterise this as 
emergent strategising to represent the decoupling from extant local practices which clashed 
with logics embedded in the new technology. 
Structural strategising: tight coupling of intended strategy with the technology
NMA faced significant business pressures that prompted managers’ intervention to adopt 
automated check-in. Heightened cost competition between NMA and other nearby airports 
meant that managers were seeking new ways to introduce cost savings to attract new airlines 
to NMA as well as retain existing customers. Additionally, the sharp rise in low cost airlines 
and increasing passenger demand had increased pressure on the airport for more flights and 
additional floor space in terminal buildings to handle greater volumes of passengers. 
Compounding these pressures were tight regulatory restrictions on expanding terminal 
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buildings. Senior managers determined that the only option available to them was to improve 
passenger-handling capacity using technology to better utilise floor space in airport terminals. 
These business pressures dominated the strategic development of NMA. In response, the 
executive team at NAG, the parent company of the NMA, created specific strategic objectives 
for their four airports. These objectives focused on optimising terminal building floor space 
and maximising passenger throughput while maintaining, or improving, customer satisfaction. 
A further strategic priority was to create cost savings which could be passed on to attract the 
new group of customers to the airport: low-fare airlines. NMA’s strategic objectives were often 
referred to by managers as the “golden principles” for strategic success. The principles were:
- Increase passenger-handling capacity without need to extend terminal buildings
- Reduce transaction cost per passenger check-in
- Improve NAG’s capability to manage terminal floor space
- Add capability to generate revenue stream from airlines
- Bridge traditional check-in and emerging technologies (mobile/internet)
- Improved customer service through fast check-in times and increased 
convenience. 
These strategic objectives were formalised and were regularly invoked by managers as the 
guiding priorities for the future of NAG’s airports. To deliver these strategic objectives, senior 
managers placed great emphasis on technology. Indeed, technology was seen as the only 
viable alternative to adding more terminal buildings in order to regain control of floor space in 
terminal buildings from airlines who were already in the process of installing their own kiosks 
and so jeopardising efforts for space optimisation. The new strategy was based on the premise 
that the company needed to “stay one step ahead with technology”, to ultimately improve 
passenger throughput and satisfaction. It is against this backdrop that CUSS kiosks emerged 
as a strategic IT project at NAG. CUSS emerged as a vehicle to achieve the “golden principles” 
as illustrated by this statement by the General Manager of Development at NAG (C)2:
2 Throughout the paper we denote whether a respondent is speaking from a corporate (C) perspective or CUSS 
project (P) perspective – this is also shown in appendix 1. This must not be confused with strategic or 
operational as, through an instantiation lens, all actors are embedded in making strategy real.
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“We thought that [CUSS] was a key investment because you could see the benefits of 
the self-service kiosk with airlines and passengers - it means that, if there are half a 
dozen machines, you can go to the one with the shortest queue. You don’t have to 
queue up at the one that is just for your airline.”
Technology became known as “the way forward” and focused the attention of the organisation 
on CUSS to deliver the formalised golden principles. As such, CUSS kiosks were implemented 
and would initially operate alongside the incumbent check-in desks, but with the aim to replace 
desks entirely. To monitor and assess the effectiveness of the technology, NAG managers set 
a performance target for CUSS in the NMA. The target set for NMA was for at least 20% of 
passenger check-in transactions to be performed using CUSS. That is, a minimum of one fifth 
of passenger check-in transactions should move from conventional check-in desks to 
automated kiosks at the airport.
The strategic intent was to exploit the kiosk technology to deliver passenger check-in at a 
lower cost, to more passengers, at faster pace, and with a higher level of passenger service. 
CUSS technology had the potential for significant cost savings, which could be passed on to 
customers (i.e., airlines and their passengers) because kiosks add capacity without having to 
extend or add new buildings. Airport management could also optimise terminal space by 
circumventing a parallel move by airlines to install their own proprietary check-in kiosks. 
Common-use kiosk infrastructure can be “used by any airline and at any time”, hence reducing 
the spread of many airline-owned kiosks. The threat of airline-owned kiosks pushed airports 
to create common-use kiosk infrastructures which could then be sold as a service across 
customer airlines, as explained by the Terminal Services Development Manager (C):
“It all started when airlines were going to self-service and more airlines were going 
individually to self-service, so airports started to say ‘there’s going to be a proliferation 
of these machines, do we start charging for floor space or create our own network?’”
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Senior management at the NMA designed CUSS to be used across airlines and be faster at 
processing passenger check-in compared to using check-in desks. The kiosks would address 
the challenge of increasing volume of passengers while also providing excellent passenger 
experience due to speeding-up the check-in process. To deliver the “golden principles” 
outlined by managers, the kiosks had specific design features. For example, to ensure a high-
speed check-in transaction, the machines used a simplified version of the check-in desk 
software (to allow passengers to check-in for the correct flight, answer security questions, 
register the number of bags for the hold of the aircraft, and provide a boarding card). The 
kiosks were also designed to provide excellent customer satisfaction and good passenger 
experience by using a fast and simple interface but also by interacting meaningfully with each 
individual passenger by asking relevant questions related to their individual booking. However, 
this then meant that the functioning of the kiosk was mostly designed to be used for standard 
individual passengers, for which the information and interaction could be more easily 
anticipated and processed. These features were meant to provide a fully automated check-in 
facility 24 hours a day and 7 days a week and reduce the number of support staff needed for 
different airlines while improving passenger experience. 
Emergent strategising: decoupling of embedded logics 
This section captures the use of the self-service kiosks and the adaptation by teams on the 
ground shaped by the way the kiosks functioned. We found that the rigid nature of the kiosks 
clashed with, and dislodged, established ways of functioning. This stimulated the decoupling 
between action on the ground and the embedded logics in CUSS, and the emergence of new 
practices, which eventually gained strategic significance. Below we capture how these 
emergent new practices reflected strategic aims. 
The self-service kiosks were originally seen as a replacement for the existing desk-based 
check-in and designed to replicate the function of the desks. A touch screen prompts 
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passengers to input required information themselves, saving the need for both a check-in desk 
and a member of staff to operate that desk. Initially, managers envisioned that this would entail 
the simple automation and self-service of a well-defined process. However, the deployment 
of the kiosks quickly showed that this assumption was far from reality. It emerged that the 
kiosks brought with them specific and unique rigid structures that required reconfiguring 
operations on the ground. Our observations of the Customer Service Assistant (CSA) teams 
revealed that the “kiosks are not like the desk check-ins” (CSA team member [P]) as they 
required frequent intervention and adaptation by team members on the ground to make them 
work. This stimulated a sense-making process for customer service teams to find distinct 
approaches to the passenger check-in process which required their intervention to make the 
kiosks ‘work’. Eventually we captured the Manager of Operations (C) reflecting on this, who 
said “kiosks don’t replace desk check-ins, they enhance and support the check-in process”. 
We see this as an early indication of managers rethinking their role and local practices in 
context of the golden principles embedded in the technology.
This unexpected realisation that the kiosks brought with them unique demands that shaped 
local operations came to light over the period of observation. This was seen initially through 
clashes between the strict way the kiosks worked and established processes on the ground. 
Our data includes multiple examples of the kiosks creating tensions that led to new processes 
and procedures to emerge. Each tension required the attention of CSAs in order to get the 
technology “to work”. We present three specific examples of these issues. Each represents a 
typical example of where the new logics embedded in the technology clashed with established 
practices on the ground, stimulating local teams to be reflexive and reinterpret their activities 
to reflect the way the new technology actually worked. Therefore, these emergent practices 
directly reflect intended strategy, but in a way that is more meaningful to the teams on the 
ground. It is this process of meaning making on the ground that we characterise as having 
strategic significance and call this process: emergent strategising. The three tensions 
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described below illustrate specific features of the technology that clashed with established 
practices and served as prompts for decoupling.
1. Shared surnames limitation to increase passenger throughput
For the kiosks to process passengers as fast as possible they provided limited features and 
functionality, and therefore were designed to serve standard cases. For example, the kiosks 
were designed to process individual passengers one at a time and this meant that they would 
not cope well with multiple passengers who shared the same initial and surname. This 
happened to be a fairly common characteristic amongst family groups as the likelihood of 
sharing a first initial and surname was significant. This limitation of the kiosk’s software meant 
that such passengers using the kiosk could not be reconciled with the booking details stored 
on an airline’s reservation system, and so the check-in transaction could not be completed at 
the kiosk. These passengers would then require help from airport staff to restart the check-in 
process at the desks. Pre-empting and screening cases that could be handled by the kiosks 
was however not always straightforward.
In response to this limitation of the kiosks, local teams created new routines whereby they 
would verbally ask passengers if they shared the same surname and first initial. At the busiest 
times the CSAs tended to direct family groups away from the kiosks and invite solo or business 
travellers to use the new technology. This enabled them to screen and select individuals who 
could use the new kiosks and reroute families towards the desk check-ins. The process was 
eventually faster for the “right” passengers, but this required rethinking local operations 
significantly. This is indicative of a typical process of interpreting the unique demands of the 
technology at the local level. The intended aim of the kiosks to speed passenger check-in 
process required local teams to screen and fast track solo passengers which stimulated the 
creation of new structures that could not be anticipated by senior management but still 
reflected their intended interests and objectives on the ground. 
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2. Large groups limitation to focus attention on individuals and customer service
Despite the strategic objective to increase volume, the kiosks were designed for an individual 
person to interact with the screen as a conversation, so answering a sequence of questions 
about their booking, passport and the usual security checks, which mirrored desk passenger 
customer service. The intention was not to dilute passenger service, but instead to make it 
even more convenient and friendly. This meant that the kiosks were not designed to process 
large groups of five or more passengers on a single booking (e.g., families or corporate 
bookings). Nevertheless, the design of the kiosks was centred on the customer or passenger, 
which meant that the screen journey was designed to provide high-quality individual 
interaction. Therefore, the group bookings could not be retrieved from an airline’s reservation 
system and thus, “large booking parties” of passengers could not use the kiosks to check-in 
and would instead have to use the conventional check-in desks. 
This limitation of the kiosks prompted local teams to rethink the operations on the ground to 
place greater emphasis on individual passenger service by framing the use of the kiosk as an 
“express”  service for passengers. This showed the teams that although volume of service 
was important, their ultimate goal was to provide a much faster passenger service, which 
would also encourage the kiosks’ future use. This example exemplifies situations where teams 
on the ground “strategised” the actual functioning of the technology through their own local 
knowledge and processes. The specific design choices of the technology to make it 
passenger-centric reacted against established practices, creating tensions which then pushed 
local teams to reinterpret their practices.
3. Limited bag drops to reduce costs
A key strategic objective for the kiosks was also to reduce costs, by serving multiple airlines 
and potentially giving the incentive for airlines to run more flights from NMA, increasing 
revenue for the airport. As part of their operation, the kiosks used dedicated bag-drop desks 
shared between multiple airlines which would serve passengers checking in using the kiosks. 
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Local teams had to try to balance the number of bag-drop desks to the number of kiosks and 
the number of passengers using the automated service versus the number of passengers 
using the conventional desk-based check-in process. However, balancing the number of bag 
drops was difficult to anticipate as it depended largely on the type of passengers per flight for 
each airline, so initially large queues would often form at the bag-drop stage, limiting the 
number of passengers who could use the kiosks. The following quote from the Product 
Research and Development Specialist (P) highlights this problem:
“…we had 42% [passenger throughput] on the previous day which is pretty good, and 
we can’t get the passengers through the bag-drop fast enough.”
Interestingly, the apparent slow-down of passenger processing because of longer queues on 
bag drops was perceived by senior airport management to be evidence of the technology 
performing “too well”. Local teams were aware that bag drops still required staff to weigh and 
tag baggage and thus incurred cost for every bag-drop opened. This stimulated discussions 
regarding who should pick-up this cost, and some suggested asking retail shops to contribute, 
the following quote from one of the team managers (P) indicates this: 
“I can’t get more bag-drops until someone agrees to pay for it. The airlines won’t want 
to pay for it. There is going to be a real need to incentivize having extra bag drops. I 
don’t know where it’s going to come from, whether it’s going to be via retail – maybe 
by giving people more time to spend in the shops before departure?”
This process of dealing with the passenger demand using kiosks and bag drops illustrates 
strategic activity on the ground, reflecting the intended strategy of reducing costs. The new 
technology displaced established structures and shaped new meaning making around cost 
savings, therefore decoupling practices (emergent strategising) from structural strategy. 
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These three selected examples highlight empirically two important findings, and important 
aspects, of our study. First that the rigid design of the kiosks dislodged established practices, 
and second that this stimulated local teams to reformulate their practices shaped by the 
demands from the new technology designed to deliver intended strategy.  Figure 1 illustrates 
these ideas as structural and emergent strategising. 
Figure 1 illustrates the tight coupling between strategic intent of automation as expressed in 
the “golden rules” and the kiosk technology (structural strategising) and then decoupling effect 
when the technology is in use on the ground and clashes with extant practices. This creates 
conditions for the emergence of local microprocesses of meaning making which are shaped 
by the strategic objectives embedded in the technology (emergent strategising). 
Figure 1: Strategising activity when technology acts as a carrier of strategy
In the next section, we draw on the concept of instantiation to analyse the above empirical 
material tracing and interpreting both structural and emergent strategic activity at the NMA.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
This section addresses the main research question: What is the role of technology realising 
strategy on the ground? We do this by conceptualising the influential effects of the self-service 
kiosk technology on the emergence of new practices on the ground consistent with intended 
strategy at the NMA. Our analysis draws on the concept of instantiation of strategy (Kouamé 
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and Langley, 2018) to examine the capacity of the kiosk technology to instantiate the business 
strategy for the airport. Technology serves as a carrier of strategic intent from the top of the 
organisation to the operational teams on the ground and instantiation explains the emergence 
of strategy from the praxis and practices that flow from its use. 
Instantiation recognises the potential for local level activity (“microprocesses” in Kouamé and 
Langley’s terms) to directly instantiate strategy. To capture this, we focus on the structuring 
effects of the kiosks on the emergence of new practices (emergent strategising) for managing 
the check-in process and passengers. The empirical material reviewed on structural 
strategising is relevant to describe the tight coupling of strategic intent in the technology, we 
also describe decoupling as the clash when the new technology is deployed in practice on the 
ground. These two aspects of tight-coupling and decoupling are already well covered and 
conceptualised in the literature going back to the seminal work of Barley (1986) showing how 
the introduction of a seemingly standard technology decouples teams from their established 
ways of working, functioning as an occasion for (re)structuring work practices and roles in the 
organisation. We saw that decoupling initiates instantiation, so our analytical work therefore 
starts post-decoupling, and we exclude it from our conceptual development. We conceptualise 
the effects that emerge once old ways of working have been decoupled, and more specifically 
analyse how practices instantiate a renewed strategy. We suggest that the new practices have 
strategic significance through technology use and analyse two effects of this as reframing and 
recoupling, each with distinct but complementary characteristics in explaining the role of 
technology in instantiating strategy on the ground. Figure 2 is a conceptualisation of 
technology as a carrier of strategy and in the instantiation of strategy in practice on the ground. 
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Figure 2: Conceptualisation of instantiation and the role of technology as a carrier of strategy
Figure 2, shows instantiation as the combination of reframing and recoupling. Together they 
explain how strategy (structural strategising) is instantiated on the ground through technology 
in use to produce emergent strategic outcomes (emergent strategising). 
Decoupling
Instantiation is initiated by the dislodging of established practices, or decoupling. We observed 
decoupling when the strict design of the kiosks disrupted the flow and processing of 
passengers at the airport. Design limitations of the kiosks to process multiple passengers with 
the same surname and large groups shaped action on the ground by focusing teams on 
meeting targets set by managers to speed up and reduce operational costs. As seen in the 
findings section, these features of the technology reflected strategic objectives based on a 
new logic of work focused on volume, service and cost. The embedded nature of these 
objectives in the technology influenced the emergence of new practices and activities at the 
local level. We suggest that the kiosks effectively carried these new logics and reshaped 
operations on the ground. We refer to the term reframing as the emergence of new 
understandings that shaped new practices in managing passenger check-in process through 
the actual use of the technology. We use the term recoupling to refer to the eventual 
congruence and integration between technology and emergent practices by management. We 
now analyse data that explains decoupling as a precedent for instantiation and then 
conceptualise the two core effects of instantiation: reframing and recoupling.
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The limited features of the kiosks facilitated the delivery of the strategic aims of the NMA 
focused on volume, speed, cost, and customer service by for example only processing certain 
types of passengers and operations. The limitations of the rigid technology required severe 
changes to the check-in process and the way teams organised their activities on the ground. 
Although the expectation was that the kiosks would be “just like desk check-in”, the teams 
quickly realised the need to abandon established routines and adopt new logics of speed and 
efficiency embedded in the kiosk technology. 
We refer to this initial effect of technology-in-use as decoupling. It captures the incongruence 
between established logics of work and emergent practices consistent with the logics 
embedded in the new technology. Decoupling therefore represents a discrepancy or 
detachment from rational extant formal arrangements and emergent organisational practices 
by local actors (Carruthers, 1995), which in our case were influenced by the rigid nature of the 
kiosk technology. Berente and Yoo (2012 p. 376) suggest a similar, more moderate, effect of 
decoupling whereby actors felt their actions could satisfy competing demands associated with 
multiple institutional logics:
“[an] enterprise system is introduced in accordance with the logic of managerial 
rationalism, but some of the institutional logics that organisational actors draw upon 
and reproduce contradict this logic (...) In these situations, organisational actors 
loosely couple elements of their practices from the practices implied by the enterprise 
system, thus satisfying the demands associated with both institutional fields.” 
In the case of Berente and Yoo (2012), local actors eventually accept and learn to operate 
across both logics. However, in our case we observe a more extreme case of loose coupling. 
The mandated and rigid nature of the technology imposes its logic without allowing space for 
any alternatives, leaving little room for across-logic consistency. We suggest that full 
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decoupling, rather than the loose-coupling (as seen in Berente and Yoo), was in our case 
considered to be a more sustainable coping mechanism for the teams using the technology. 
This is because it was easier for the teams to appropriate and accept the logics embedded in 
the new technology rather than trying to make compromises that allowed them to operate 
across the two separate institutional fields (Noir and Walsham, 2007). Therefore, decoupling 
represents the separation between extant formalised structure and ceremonial conformity 
from emerging practices shaped by the use of the new kiosk technology. Decoupling allows 
for a shift of focus towards new practices which become moderated by the design of the new 
technology, an effect which we conceptualise next as reframing.
Reframing
The use of the kiosks therefore required accommodating and appropriating these design 
choices, centred particularly on logics of speed, volume, service and cost. These strategic 
aims were vital for the NMA, but only realisable by the reflexive activities of CSAs and 
managers on the ground to achieve an effective integration of the kiosks with the desk-based 
check-in process. Reframing represents this adjustment of operations on the ground around 
these strategic aims carried by the technology. 
Reframing refers to the adoption of these new “schemata of interpretation” (Snow et al., 1986) 
for decoupled local activities. It represents the spread and acceptance of new logics consistent 
with the features of the kiosks and emerging local practices. This process of frame realigning 
(reframing) as described by Snow et al. (1986) involves transforming or replacing “old 
understandings and meanings” with new ones. The rigid nature of the kiosk technology 
brought with them new frames of reference which influenced emerging coping behaviours and 
practices, leaving no room for “old meaning structures”. That is, the logics embedded in the 
new technology reshaped situated local practices, and stimulated the development of new 
understandings and stock of knowledge (Schutz, 1962, Berger and Luckmann, 1967) relevant 
to the new reality of working with the kiosk technology. Kouame and Langley (2018) argue 
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that it is through the day-to-day activities and the learning and reflexivity that they entail that 
strategy is made real and performed in practice. It is this change in local practices juxtaposed 
with the strategic aims embedded in the new technology we characterise as reframing. 
Reframing is the collective legitimation of new acceptable explanations of emergent practices 
and behaviours for example, the improvised practices for screening large groups of 
passengers and moving them away from the kiosk preserved the overall strategy as ‘working’. 
This shift in thinking for managing check-in operations on the ground represent the emergence 
of these new frames of reference (Goffman, 1974).  Reframing (or the production of a frame) 
is what allows people to understand what has changed and what has become accepted as 
normal in new day-to-day practices. Goffman (1974) suggests that these new schemas of 
interpretation give individuals a revised sense of purpose and meaning to new reality that they 
face on the ground.
In our case, the “new acceptable explanations” became the enabling the technology to 
address volume of passengers, service improvement and cost reduction, which encapsulated 
the golden principles of NAG and NMA strategy. These three “explanations” for the new ways 
to manage passenger check-in process settled initial incongruences between the logics 
embedded in the technology and previous ways of working, when the kiosks were introduced, 
and became the accepted frames of reference used to drive emergent changes to the 
operations on the ground. Reframing is therefore a higher level construct which operates at 
the level of sense making (Galliers and Newell, 2003, Weick, 1995, Jensen et al., 2009) by 
creating acceptable “explanations” that resolve inherent inconsistencies between technology 
in use and previous established norms and logics of work. This is evident in the many 
unintended effects of the kiosks. For example, the difficulties in managing bag drop desks 
meant that the teams had to rethink and develop new practices to accommodate and support 
the faster pace of the kiosks, but the emergent solution to this was shaped by both the new 
technology and their understanding of local conditions.
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While reframing represents the creation of newly accepted explanations on the ground which 
justify emergent activity, the recognition of the strategic significance of these emergent 
activities is still limited and not formalised. We conceptualise this effect as recoupling, as the 
point where instantiation of a strategy takes shape.
Recoupling
Recoupling is the attribution of strategic meaning to new emergent practices. It represents the 
reification of strategy as executed in practice. Recoupling is when planned strategy becomes 
tangible or explicit as a set of practices and behaviours and therefore can be visualised and 
measured. While reframing is the emergence of practices consistent with the new logics 
embedded in the technology, recoupling is the attribution of strategic meaning to these new 
practices. 
Recoupling represents the forming of accepted formal links between emergent local frames 
of reference and preestablished strategic aims. Snow et al. (1986 p.464) indicate that the 
linking between local interpretive orientations with higher levels structures happens when 
“individual interests, values and beliefs … goals and ideology are congruent and 
complementary”. This process of relating and relaying reframed local activities back to higher 
level organisational structures is achieved through the assignment of meaning to new 
practices, such as when the bag drop desks were failing to cope with demand; this was 
eventually seen as the kiosks “working too well”. 
It is this attachment of emergent activity to strategic themes that recouples the effects of 
technology-in-use with strategic intent. Recoupling helps to produce a ‘working’ version of 
strategy by attributing strategic meaning to reframed activity on the ground. It is this effort to 
integrate and create congruence of framing across groups within organisations (Olesen, 2014) 
that links technology-in-use with higher-level strategic aims. This type of activity was salient 
in our analysis, particularly in the regular visits by senior management to discuss targets and 
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strategic relevance of the kiosks to NMA, all of which reinforced the link between new 
processes, roles and reporting mechanisms to strategic aims captured in the “golden 
principles”. 
Strategy instantiation 
Instantiation is therefore the combination of both reframing and recoupling. Two important 
conclusions can be drawn from our case. First, through decoupling, reframing and recoupling 
– as seen in the practices by operational teams – strategy is realised in practice. That is, 
strategy is instantiated in the organisation through practice and not merely by planning or 
iterations of process improvement. Second, teams on the ground were crucial because their 
learning and reflexivity enabled a working strategy to emerge from a rigid technology that 
forced decoupling from established ways of working. Using the concept of instantiation, we 
were able to show that strategic intent can be carried by a technology which, in turn, prompts 
actors to reframe and recouple practices to technology and strategy.
The six ‘golden principles’ represented a planned strategy of automation, whereby the kiosks 
would deliver these aims eventually with no need for Customer Service Assistants (CSAs) to 
help passengers. However, as the strategy is instantiated by teams on the ground, it became 
clear that CSAs were actually vital to the success of the strategy. The dialogue between 
managers and the project teams refocused on passenger throughput above all other aims. It 
was clear that customer service staff would be needed to ensure the kiosks continued to work 
and process enough passenger check-ins. The instantiated strategy thus became one of 
passenger throughput, abandoning full automation. The principle of using the kiosks as a 
temporary technology as internet and smartphone check-in took far longer to implement than 
expected. Although, the airlines paid for the use of the kiosks, managers became far more 
focused on the number of check-ins performed, rather than the revenues the kiosks could 
generate. This was only rendered visible by studying the microprocesses of the actors 
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involved. Figure 3 represents what happened to planned strategy by showing the elements of 
the Airport’s strategy that were instantiated in practice.
Figure 3: Instantiated strategy of passenger throughput
This conceptualisation of instantiation as a combination of reframing and recoupling, takes 
this notion one step further from that which is presented by Kouamé and Langley (2018). We 
break down the notion of instantiation into two elements which, together, show how local action 
and technology use directly constitutes strategic intent in practice. We therefore contribute to 
the theoretical development of instantiation in this way and incorporate technology as a carrier 
of strategy in so doing. We capture the role that technology plays in instantiating strategy, by 
carrying strategic intent and reshaping emergent activity through reframing and recoupling 
operating logics on the ground. 
Another important contribution is the realisation that strategy is also formulated at ground level 
and not only at the upper echelons of organisations. We highlight the range of significant 
strategic activity at the local level because it is at the local level that strategy gains practical 
meaning by “rendering events or occurrences meaningful” (Snow et al., 1986 p.464). It is the 
emergence of these new meaning structures shaped and framed by technology that “function 
to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective” (ibid.) towards 
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intended aims and objectives. We explain this effect by showing how strategy carried by the 
technology shaped emergent practices through actual use of that technology.
It is therefore problematic to take a deterministic view that sees the deployment of technology 
as sufficient in executing and delivering strategic intent. Instead, our study places full 
emphasis on the practices of technology use as the locus of strategy instantiation. Although 
CUSS influenced emergent activity on the ground, it is the teams on the ground who rethink 
practices and actively make sense of the new technology. Kouamé and Langley (2018) refer 
to this as learning and reflexivity. It is the flow of practice and the learning and reflexivity of 
the local teams that instantiates strategy. In the next section we discuss this further and 
provide an overview of the key contributions to theory and practice from this study.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study responds to growing calls to better capture and conceptualise the strategic 
significance of activity at the ground level of organisations, particularly in the context of large 
technology projects (Arvidsson and Holmstrom, 2018, Arvidsson et al., 2014, Peppard et al., 
2014, Carugati et al., 2018). This emphasis on local level activity is important because “people 
do not directly respond to social structures, but rather to the situations they face and their 
interpretations of them” (Bechky 2011 p. 1157). While other fields, such as Strategy and 
Organisation Studies, have engaged more productively with research at this level, much 
research in the Information Systems field still takes a ‘helicopter view’ from the top of 
organisations and is belatedly striding in this direction (Whittington, 2014). 
In response, we add to this programme of research by focusing on “the significance of micro-
level interactions that are often understudied or forgotten, and the way in which they can be 
consequential” (Kouamé and Langley, 2018 p. 15). In particular, we capture the capacity of 
technology to embed strategic intent and its role in moderating local level activity to be 
consistent with that strategy. 
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To repeat, the research question driving this study was: What is the role of technology realising 
strategy on the ground? To amplify the desired effects of embedded strategic aims and 
associated local practices, we selected a case where the technology is mandated, rigid and 
single-purposed. The case shows how senior management of a UK regional airport deployed 
ten self-service check-in kiosks to meet fundamental strategic aims of the organisation. We 
conceptualised the role technology played in instantiating strategic intent by decoupling 
established practices and logics of work, and in influencing the framing of activities on the 
ground to reflect intended strategy. 
The concept of strategy instantiation (Kouamé and Langley 2018) was used to capture the 
link between strategy structures developed at the top of the organisation and the activity of 
teams on the ground. We show how these “microprocesses directly instantiate or constitute 
the macro-processes through which the organisation exists or is changing” (Kouamé and 
Langley, 2018 p. 14). This is in contrast with processual views of strategy, which see strategy 
as an ongoing effort by the organisation to move towards a particular goal over time. In our 
case, we found that the structures embedded in technology stimulated emergent activity and 
processes of meaning making consistent with those structures. We analyse this by first 
showing how kiosk technology became central to the strategic objectives of an airport group 
in the UK. 
We use structural strategising to capture the capacity of the kiosk technology to embed 
strategic aims. We then trace the activities of local teams at the airport during actual use of 
the kiosks. We use the term emergent strategising to capture the enactment of strategic intent 
by local teams by appropriation of the kiosk technology for passenger check-in operations. 
We show that decoupling enables the instantiation of strategy through reframing and 
recoupling as teams and managers revise their practices. We describe decoupling to 
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represent the detachment that happens when new technology brings distinct logics that force 
the dislodging of established practices and routines (Berente and Yoo, 2012). We then 
conceptualise reframing to represent the way restrictions in the technology shape and frame 
(Goffman, 1974) emergent practices consistent with intended aims embedded in the 
technology. Finally we conceptualise recoupling as the affirmation that these new practices 
represent strategy and are congruent with the strategic intent set at the top of the organisation 
(Snow et al., 1986). 
Our analysis provides a fresh perspective on the way we research and conceptualise the 
strategic role of technology and strategising activity within organisations. We argue that 
technology has the capacity to act as a carrier of strategy by decoupling, reframing and 
recoupling logics which shape practices at the local level that are consistent with strategic 
intent at a broader level – in essence, how technology plays a vital role in the instantiation of 
strategy. In our case, the intended strategy of full automation is instantiated as strategy of 
(maximising) passenger throughput. While it is no surprise that emergent strategies differ from 
those planned, our study shines new light on the vital role played by micro-level activity in 
forming the ‘working’ emergent strategy.
In sum, we propose that instantiation provides fruitful new ground to view technology not just 
as a strategic asset in itself, but actually as a vehicle of sense-giving across organisations 
(Rouleau, 2005). Our study shows how technology can be central to sense-giving in strategy 
(Rouleau, 2005), which is a novel view in Information Systems Strategy literature. Despite the 
growing focus on ‘big data’ right now (e.g., Gunther et al., 2017, Jones, 2018), our study is an 
important reminder that the technology itself – even conventional and rigid technologies – play 
a central role in actualising strategy.
This resonates with, and extends, recent studies on strategic information systems 
implementation and use (Arvidsson et al., 2014), the aligning in practice perspective of 
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Karpovsky and Galliers (2015), and the strategising concept more generally (Galliers, 2011, 
2004). This paper goes further by conceptualising strategy as embedded in everyday practice 
in organisations, breaking therefore with the traditional view that strategy is formulated at the 
top and executed at ground level in organisations (King, 1978). We provide a nuanced view 
of strategy by connecting structural and emergent strategising in organisations through the 
concept of instantiation. Conceptually we establish a more nuanced distinction between 
instantiation and implementation of strategy by showing how ground level activity has strategic 
significance and value on its own. We develop this perspective and contribute to the 
Information Systems field by conceptualising the link between micro level activity, strategic 
intent and realised strategy with a fresh analysis of how strategies become ‘reality’ within an 
organisation as carried by technology.
The chosen case represents a technology that has been mandated by an organisation and is 
rigid in nature. This setting enabled us better to observe the capacity of technology to embed 
strategy and stimulate the emergence of practices consistent with the strategic imperatives 
embedded in it. Although these effects may manifest more strongly in this particular context, 
we believe that they are present in other less extreme contexts and technologies too, although 
we concede that more research is needed to study the strength of these effects in different 
contexts. For example, less rigid technologies with greater degree of interpretive flexibility may 
carry weaker framing structures and therefore require greater effort from management to 
achieve comparable effects of instantiation of strategy on the ground. 
We seek to demonstrate that instantiation is a helpful and insightful step towards the “synergy” 
between information systems and strategy-as-practice research (Peppard et al., 2014) 
because it links the day-to-day micro strategising practices to higher level strategic 
macroprocesses in organisations. We offer this perspective mindful of the limitations of micro 
or practice-level research that often lead to micro-isolationism, by artificially separating those 
practices and practitioners from important contextual components (their organisation, 
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strategy, or the institutions they occupy), or by ‘parking’ such components as outside the realm 
of practice research (Seidl and Whittington, 2014). Of course, a single case cannot provide 
straightforward normative and generalisable implications because of the highly contextualised 
nature of our study (Koume and Langley, 2018). Instead, a goal of this kind of research is 
“transferability” rather than “generalisability” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, Lee and Baskerville, 
2003). Rather than generate normative or prescriptive directions for managers, the concepts 
of decoupling, reframing and recoupling provide the basis for managers to reflexively examine 
and learn from their organisational strategising.
This study also provides a distinctive multilevel perspective of strategic activity in 
organisations, responding to calls for more practice-based studies in Information Systems 
research (Peppard et al., 2014), and to go beyond first and second order of effects of digital 
transformation in organisations (Baptista et al., 2020). By taking a practice-based view to 
examine the role of technology as a carrier of strategy we also provide a novel contribution to 
the Information Systems Strategy literature. In particular, bringing the concept of instantiation 
of strategy (Kouamé and Langley 2018) from the strategy literature to explain the role of 
technology as a carrier of strategic intent in organisations. By so doing, we contribute to both 
fields with a novel view of technology in organisational strategising. Future research could 
start to look for integrative approaches (Weiser et al., 2020) or hybrid research designs 
(Kouame and Langley, 2018), whereby established research approaches – for example, 
variance studies – are combined with process and instantiation (practice) research. 
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Appendix 1: Data collection: detailed observation and interviews list
Observations Interviews
Stakeholders present Length Interviews Organisation Level: Corporate 
(C) or Project (P)
Research and 
Development Manager; 






























8 (2 site 
visits)
Terminal Manager NMA C/P
Customer Services 
Manager; 2x CSAs






3 Customer Service 
Manager
NMA P









Head of Operations UK Airline2 C





Technical Consultant “KioskTech” 
(Vendor)
P
UK Airport CEO Rival Airport C
Operations Manager Rival Airport P
Managing Director Aircraft 
Handling Tech
C
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Appendix 2: Coding tables 
In the methodology section we explain our approach to data collection and analysis. The figure 
below is simplified version of our coding process as described by Gioia et al. (2012). It involved 
coding interview and observation material, generating over 100 open codes and 15 second 
order codes. These mapped to the main concepts covered in the theory section, which 
emerged empirically and theoretically during the research.
“It all started when airlines were going to 
self-service and more and more airlines 
were going individually to self-service 
and airports then started to say ‘oi, you 
know, there’s going to be a proliferation 
of these machines” 
- Pressure from other airports
- Pressure more passengers
- Must increase throughput
- Improve satisfaction
- Kiosks are the future























- Kiosks have lots of problems
- Can’t work as previously
- Adjust lines and queueing
- Kiosks require new roles 
- Kiosks deliver on goals
- Kiosks work too well
- …
- Kiosks not like desks check-
ins
- Kiosks not as expected
- Previous lines don’t work
- New ways emerge
- Local needs are key
- Kiosks disrupt
- …
- Embrace new approach
- New roles and practices
- Local teams happy
- Kiosks extend desks check-
ins
- Kiosks support local team
- Kiosks can be useful
- …
- Kiosks perform too well
- Kiosks help meet targets
- Kiosks deliver needed change
- Kiosks support the airport
- Kiosks not just technology
- Kiosks are strategic
- …
“…passengers could be from either of 
those airline groups and go up to a 
machine and check-in. That is really, in 
the end what you’re trying to do. If there 
are half a dozen machines, you can go to 
the one with the shortest queue, not just 
the one for your airline.” 
“particularly at the beginning the host role 
will be more to actually pull people 
across to even try the machines… there 
are going to be a load of machines 
standing there and nobody will use 
them… well, apart from people who’ve 
used them somewhere else”
“…what we’re doing is using our CSAs 
and they’ll all be trained as CUSS hosts. 
There are quite a lot of things they won’t 
check-in a group size over such, and if 
you’re there with a baby, buggy, etc. We 
send them to traditional check-in desk 
because of all the issues.”
Staff talk. The airport manager notes that 
they “got 35% through yesterday”, so 
35% of all passengers used CUSS. There 
are a few nods. Staff are pleased that the 
airport manager is enthusiastic about 
exceeding “20% throughput handed down 
by Manchester”
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